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1. Introduction 
Staying in the market is a basic requisite for firm success. Traditionally, studies in economics 
have used the likelihood of survival (as opposed to exit), or its duration, as an indicator of 
firm performance (Audretsch, 1995; Klepper, 2002). Management studies, in contrast, 
highlight exit as being part of the overall strategy of a firm (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; 
Villalonga & McGahan, 2005). In addition to closing down activity or bankruptcy, both of 
which are signs of failure, a firm may choose to exit the market by merging with or selling out 
to another. In these cases, exit does not equate with failure. The decision to exit can be made 
by the entrepreneur or the firm’s management for the purpose of increasing efficiency or 
harvesting the rents from its business activity. Indeed, new firms are often created by 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists with the specific objective of selling on to larger firms. 
Most studies examining firm exit and survival apply a definition of exit that includes both the 
actual death of a firm and exit as a result of merger and acquisition (M&A). This is often a 
reflection of lack of data to allow a distinction to be made among modes of firm exit. The aim 
of this paper is to illustrate the different influences of firm attributes on exit mode - either 
failure or change of ownership.  
A well-known interpretation of firm exit relies on Jovanovic’s (1982) model of 
‘passive’ learning (Pakes & Ericson, 1998). By assuming that a firm, through experience in 
production, learns its unknown level of efficiency, the model predicts that the risk of exit is 
negatively related to firm age and size. This relationship has been widely documented in the 
empirical literature, but little attention has been paid to the effects of ‘active’ learning that 
result of the firm’s engagement in innovative activities (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Ericson & 
Pakes, 1995).  
This paper explores the contribution of innovation to firms’ exit, by identifying its 
distinct influences on various modes of exit – failure, M&A and radical restructuring. The 
paper makes a number of contributions. First, unlike the definition of firm exit employed in 
most empirical studies, it separates the event of firm failure from the event of exit through 
change of ownership, which in fact may represent a success for the firm. Second, it provides 
new evidence on the determinants of firm failure, often explained on the basis of firm age and 
size, by focusing on the innovative activities carried out by the firm. Third, it adds to the 
understanding of the role of technology in the M&A decision process, by exploring how 
innovation in the target firm affects the likelihood of takeover. It does so by linking two 
harmonised and comprehensive micro-economic datasets collected by the Central Bureau of 
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Statistics Netherlands (CBS): the annual General Business Register (ABR) in 1996 – 2002 
and the second Community Innovation Survey (CIS-2).   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
and empirical studies on the factors that influence firm exit by failure or ownership change, 
focusing on the role of innovation. Section 3 describes the data used to construct the variables 
and estimate the econometric model presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the empirical 
results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Firm innovation and exit 
According to Schumpeter (1934), innovation driven competition is what ultimately leads to 
the emergence in the market of winners and losers. Innovation explains “especially in a 
competitive economy … the process by which individuals and families rise and fall 
economically and socially and which is peculiar to this form of organisation” (Schumpeter, 
1934, p. 67). Economic models that embody a Schumpeterian process of competition as the 
driver of firm and industry dynamics, are based on the assumption of ‘active’ learning 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; Ericson & Pakes, 1995). In other words, firms invest resources in 
research and development (R&D) and improve their efficiency through a stochastic process of 
innovative search.1 Therefore, higher investment in innovative search increases the chances of 
the firm discovering new opportunities and improving efficiency. However, higher investment 
in R&D also means more ‘Knightian’ type uncertainty, as the outcomes of innovative search 
are unknowable a priori. In a Schumpeterian approach, innovation creates new opportunities 
to gain economic rents for the firm that introduces it in the market, thereby reducing that 
firm’s probability of failure. However, because of the uncertainty associated with the search 
process, innovation can also have the opposite effect of increasing the probability of firm 
failure.  
Management studies point to the contribution of a firm’s knowledge and capabilities, 
seen as strategic assets, to firm performance (Winter, 1987). In particular, the resource-based 
view (RBV) of the firm argues that, in order to achieve a competitive advantage, a firm needs 
to build and mobilise resources that are specific to its own activities and difficult to imitate 
(Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1986). These resources include not only physical and human capital, 
but also skills, heuristics, and know-how that are partly tacit, and are stored by the firm in the 
form of routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 1987). In this perspective, innovation can 
                                               
1
 In contrast, Jovanovic’s (1982) model of adaptive or ‘passive’ learning assumes that firm-specific levels of 
efficiency are invariant over time (Pakes & Ericson, 1998). 
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be regarded as a resource and a capability, which helps the firm to build competitive 
advantage and reduce the risk of failure. However, the risk of the firm being acquired may 
increase. Large firms often use M&A as a strategy to obtain resources and capabilities that are 
otherwise difficult to transfer or to build in-house (James, Georghiou & Metcalfe, 1998; Ranft 
& Lord, 2002). Innovation enhances the ‘value’ of the resources of a potential seller, and 
especially of a technology based firm, which becomes more attractive as an acquisition. In 
sum, the RBV of the firm predicts that innovation contributes negatively to the risk of exit by 
failure, and positively to the risk of exit by M&A.  
The issue of firm failure is also central to organisational ecology. This approach 
maintains that a firm survives if it is ‘reliable’, which, in turn, requires a certain degree of 
‘structural inertia’ in the organisation (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Structural inertia 
guarantees the stability of organizational practices, routines and structures. It allows the firm 
to maintain a stable network of relationships within the organisation and with external parties. 
By innovating, a firm may undermine its operating routines (Barnett & Freeman, 2001). For 
example, new product developments may put strain on the balance of power between product 
divisions, the supply chain may require changes, new customers may be needed. These 
disruptions can become critical when several new products are introduced at the same time. 
The risk of organisational failure is thus likely to increase with the number of innovations 
(Barnett & Freeman, 2001).  
 Although the empirical evidence is limited, there is some support for the claim that 
innovation reduces the risk of exit. Hall (1987) finds that the stock of knowledge of a firm, as 
measured by the share of accumulated R&D expenditure on total capital, has a positive effect 
on its likelihood of survival. This effect however is less evident for firms that hold patents 
than for those that do not. In a recent study of Spanish manufacturing firms, the exit risk for 
firms investing in R&D was found to be 57 per cent lower than for firms that did not, and this 
effect was enhanced by the firm’s international orientation (Perez, Llopis & Llopis, 2004). 
Using data on Dutch manufacturing firms for the period 1996–2003, Cefis and Marsili (2005; 
2006) show that innovative firms that introduced a new or an improved product or process, 
experience higher survival probabilities than non-innovators. In contrast, Bruderl, 
Preisendorfen and Ziegle (1992) found no significant differences in the mortality rates of 
innovative and traditional firms, for a sample of firms in Upper Bavaria, founded in 1985–
1986 and observed in 1990.   
Other empirical studies focus on what determines the probability that a firm will be 
acquired, based on various interpretations of motivations for takeover bids. Traditionally, 
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these motives are financial or managerial. Firms negotiate acquisitions in order to replace 
inefficient management, to exploit undervalued growth potential in the target firm, to obtain 
free cash flow, and to access tangible fixed assets (Powell, 1997). Related to these motives are 
the characteristics of the acquired firm, including firm size, and stock market value before the 
takeover bid, which have been found to shape the likelihood of being acquired (Powell, 1997). 
There is contrasting evidence however on whether units of higher or lower performance (e.g. 
productivity, market value) are more likely to be acquired (Caves, 1998). The evidence 
appears to be conditional on the size of the plant targeted for acquisition (McGuckin & 
Nguyen, 1995). On the one hand, unproductive (large) plants are acquired because they own 
resources that can be reallocated to better management or more productive use. On the other 
hand, highly productive (small) plants offer opportunities that could be better exploited if 
matched with the resources of the acquirer (Caves, 1998). Departing from this approach, 
recent research has emphasised the transfer of knowledge and intangible assets from the 
acquired to the acquiring firm as a motive for takeover (James, Georghiou & Metcalfe, 1998). 
For example, in an empirical study of the M&A process in Finland, Lehto and Lehtoranta 
(2004) observe that a greater stock of R&D capital enhances the probability of a firm’s being 
acquired. This effect is mediated by the type of industry in which the firm is active, as it 
emerges only in non-processing industries; it is not significant in processing industries. 
Consistent with this interpretation, we concentrate on innovation as a characteristic that may 
cause a firm to become a target for takeover. We consider that innovation, as a firm resource 
and capability, may have divergent effects on the probabilities of failure and takeover, and 
that these effects are shaped by the nature of the innovation in products or in processes, that 
the original firm is able to realise.  
 
3. Competing risks models 
The main aim of our empirical analysis is to model the effects of firm innovative activities on 
different modes of exit. Specifically, we consider three types of events that induce the exit of 
a firm: actual death or failure; M&A; and radical restructuring. Because these three types of 
exits may have different causes and consequences, we choose a model that has the potential to 
differentiate between the outcomes. We estimated a competing risks model that enables 
pursuit of two aims: (i) to analyse the factors that influence the probability of an event 
occurring (in our case the event is firm exit); and (ii) to distinguish the effects of these factors 
on the event resulting from different modalities (failure, M&A, and radical restructuring). The 
exit of a firm is an event that occurs in continuous time, but it is reported in discrete time, in 
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our case monthly. We therefore applied the discrete-time method proposed by Allison (1982) 
and extended by Jenkins (1995; 2004) to estimate the model’s parameters taking into account 
the discrete nature of our data. The model is based on the definition of a latent variable 
representing the uncensored failure time jT  for each specific modality j of the exit event, 
for 1,...,j k= . The observed failure time min{ }j jT T=  is censored for the firms that survive 
throughout the period. The discrete-time hazard rate specific to the exit mode j for firm i is 
defined as 
 ( ) Pr{ ; }ji ji ji ith t T t T t= = ≥ X  (1) 
where itX  is a vector of covariates. Consequently, the probability of observing a spell of 
length t  for a specific type of exit j  is: 
 ( ) Pr{ } ( ) ( 1)ji j ji ip t T t h t S t= = = −  (2) 
where S(t) is the discrete time survivor function, which can be written as 
 [ ]
1
( ) Pr{ } 1 ( ) [1 ( )] ( 1)
t
i i i i i
s
S t T t h s h t S t
=
= > = − = − −∏ . (3) 
where  
1
( ) ( )
k
i ji
j
h t h t
=
=  is the hazard function for any type of exit equal to the sum of the 
single hazard functions, specific to the various types of exit, assuming independent competing 
risks.  
 
Combining (3) and (2) leads to:  
 
( )( ) Pr{ } ( )
1 ( )
ji
ji ji i
i
h t
p t T t S t
h t
= = =
−
 (4) 
 
The contribution of the ith firm with observed spell t  (uncensored or censored) to the 
likelihood is  
 
1
1
Pr{ } Pr{ } jj
k
i ji i
j
L T t T t δδ −
=

= = >∏  (5) 
where jiδ  is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the ith observation of jT  is uncensored and 
equal to 0 if it is censored; the observation is considered as censored when either the firm does 
not exit during the considered time period or the firm exits by means of a type of exit different 
from j.   
Given the previous properties, the firm’s contribution to the log-likelihood is:  
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This likelihood depends only on the hazards that are specific to the various types of exit, and 
therefore only requires the specification of single hazard functions in relation to the 
covariates itX . However, the overall log-likelihood does not have the property (which holds 
for continuous independent competing risks models) that it can be partitioned into the sum of 
separate parts, each corresponding to a single type of event. Therefore, the model cannot be 
estimated by means of separate duration models, each formulated for a certain type of exit and 
corresponding censoring indicator
j
δ . It can be estimated creating a new variable 
,ji ty , which 
is set equal to 1 if firm i  experiences an exit of type j  at time t , and equal to 0 otherwise, 
with 
,
1
t
ji ji s
s
yδ
=
=  
Allison (1982) proposed selection of a generalised form of the logistic function for the hazard 
rate, which is a common choice for a non-proportional hazard specification. 
 
'
'
1
exp{ }( )
1 exp{ }
j it
ji k
j it
j
X
h t
X
β
β
=
=
+
 (7) 
In this case the log-likelihood is equivalent to that of a multinomial logit model, in which the 
unit of analysis is the time spell. An alternative specification for the hazard function is the 
complementary log-log form (Jenkins, 1995).  
 
'( ) 1 exp{ exp[ ]}ji j ith t Xβ= = −  (8) 
Discrete-time competing risks models can be related to underlying continuous-time duration 
models, under specific assumptions on the shape of the continuous-time hazards within 
discrete intervals (Jenkins, 1995; 2004). In particular, the ‘complementary log-log model’ is 
the discrete-time counterpart of a continuous-time proportional hazards model, in which 
failure times are grouped in unit intervals and registered only at the end of each time period 
(Prentice & Gloeckler, 1978). That is, events take place only at the boundaries of intervals. In 
this case, the overall likelihood does have the property of being separable into destination 
specific components, and therefore the model can be estimated through independent single-
event models, assuming appropriate censoring conditions on each type of exit 
(Narendranathan & Stewart, 1993). Likewise, Jenkins (2004) proves that the ‘multinomial 
logit model’ represents an approximation in discrete time of a duration model, in which each 
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type of event takes place in continuous time (between discrete observations) with specific 
hazard rates that remain constant within intervals. 
 
In our empirical analysis we have estimated an independent competing risks model, in order 
to assess separately the effects of firm innovation and the control variables on the hazard rates 
of firms, distinguishing among different modes of exit. Because the month of exit is available 
in our dataset, we apply a discrete-time model using a multinomial logit formulation. In 
addition, we carry out a sensitivity analysis with respect to the assumptions on the continuous 
hazards that yield the observed duration times, using the complementary log-log model.  
 
4. Data and measurements 
This study is based on two micro-economic databases collected and managed by the CBS: the 
annual ABR and the CIS-2 for the Netherlands.  
Firm data on innovation are drawn from the second national survey of innovation in the 
Netherlands, based on the core Eurostat CIS (CBS, 1998). Within Europe, CIS surveys have 
been conducted since the early 1990s, with periodicity of four years in most countries. The 
CIS data are increasingly being used as a key data source in the study of innovation and its 
effects on performance at firm level, in Europe, Canada and Australia (Cassiman & 
Veugelers, 2002; Mairesse & Mohnen, 2002). The second CIS for the Netherlands was 
administered in 1997. It provides information on innovative activities and performance in the 
period 1994–1996, for a large sample of firms with at least 10 employees. These firms were 
extracted from those present in the ABR in 1996 in order to constitute a stratified random 
sample, based on size class, region and industrial sector at the 2-digit standard industry 
classification (SIC) code level. For the manufacturing sector, the number of respondents to 
CIS-2 was 3,299 firms, with a response rate of 71 per cent.  
We matched the data on respondents to CIS-2 with data from the ABR for 1996, from 
which the CIS-2 sample was extracted. This allowed us to combine, at firm level, data on 
innovation for a large set of firms, with data on exit and other covariates (such as age, size and 
sector), derived from the ABR for the same set of firms.  
The ABR comprises annual records for all firms that are registered for fiscal purposes 
in the Netherlands. The annual dataset is constructed longitudinally: for each firm present in 
the population at a certain year, it reports the month that the firm was first included in the 
register and the month that the firm was eventually dropped from the register. Because of its 
comprehensive nature and its fiscal purpose, the dates of inclusion and exclusion in the 
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register are very close approximations of the actual dates of entry and exit in the market. It is 
worth noting that the definition of entry and exit is based on the entire population of firms: it 
excludes changes in a firm’s sector of activity, which is regarded as a continuing firm. The 
population includes self-employment, that is, firms with 0 employees. For the manufacturing 
sector in 1996 the ABR includes 61,177 firms.  
The annual ABR allows the mode of firm exit to be identified. We distinguish three 
categories. ‘Exit by failure’, which includes firms dropped from the register because of 
termination of activities (either voluntary or by bankruptcy).2 The category ‘exit by M&A’ 
includes: where a firm is merged with other(s) into a firm with a new identity, and where the 
firm is acquired by another firm, which maintains its identity. The third category of ‘exit by 
radical restructuring’ accounts for where a firm is decomposed into several units (some of 
which may reappear in the register as new firms, some of which may be sold to other firms), 
or where the firm undergoes a major transformation, which results in a change to its legal or 
economic identity. By combining this information from the annual ABR datasets for 1996 to 
2003, we can follow the sequence of exits up to December 2003, for each type of exit.  
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
Table 1 provides composition and average employment for the set of firms from the 
CIS-2 and the population from the ABR, according to mode of exit, for the period 1996–2002. 
Because only firms with 10 or more employees are included in the CIS-2, we also report the 
ABR data that relates only to the population of firms above the same threshold. This excludes 
more than three-quarters of firms included in the ABR data. Bearing in mind that the ABR 
also includes firms with 0 employees, the large majority of firms in the Netherlands are small 
or even very small, and are not included in the innovation surveys of the European Union.3 
The percentage of continuing firms is higher in CIS-2 than for the whole population in the 
ABR and for the set with more than 10 employees. This is due to the effect of size on firm 
survival. Indeed, as previous work using the same data (Cefis & Marsili, 2005; 2006) shows, 
survival probabilities increase with firm size. When we look at exit modes we can see that the 
                                               
2
 The data do not allow us to distinguish between exit resulting from bankruptcy and exit due to voluntary 
closure. However, for the purposes of our analysis, these two types of exits can be considered equivalent. In 
general, the ownership of a firm does not close a profitable firm without selling the whole or part of the firm, 
which would be recorded in our data set, respectively, as an acquisition or a radical restructuring. 
3
 For the CIS-2, few countries like the Netherlands, Finland and the UK set threshold of 10 employees; the 
threshold for all the other countries is 20 employees. 
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number of firms that exited the market due to failure is much higher for the whole ABR than 
for the other two samples. This is because micro firms (less than 10 employees) are more 
likely to exit the market and, in particular, to exit due to failure, than larger firms. 
Furthermore micro firms are obviously much less likely to undertake a restructuring process 
and are much less involved in M&As. The average number of employees for firms exiting as 
a result of failure is six, for those exiting through M&As around 34, and for exits due to 
restructuring 227.  
 
Dependent variable  
The duration variable is the length of time from January 1996 to the time of exit from the 
ABR. The exit event is differentiated into: failure, M&A and radical restructuring. The 
survival time is measured in months and is censored to the right for firms that had survived to 
December 2003, the last month for which the date and exit mode for firms listed in the ABR 
are available.    
 
Independent variables 
The ability of a firm to innovate is our main variable of interest. On the basis of the CIS-2 
dataset, we define a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is an ‘innovator’ and to 0, if 
the firm is a ‘non-innovator’ (we label the variable innov). An innovator is a firm that has 
introduced a product or a process innovation in the period 1994-1996. A non-innovator is a 
firm that either has not engaged in innovative activities in that period, or carried out 
innovative projects that were unsuccessful or incomplete at the end of 1996. Beyond the 
general ability of a firm to innovate, we consider that the nature of the innovation, product or 
a process, may shape its effects on hazard rates, leading to divergent effects for different types 
of exit. For this purpose, we introduce two other dummy variables. A dummy that is equal to 
1 if a firm is a ‘product innovator’, that is, if it has introduced a new or an improved product 
in the period 1994-1996, and equal to 0 otherwise (pdt), and a dummy that is equal to 1 if the 
firm is a ‘process innovator’, that is, if it has introduced a new or an improved process in the 
period 1994-1996, and equal to 0 otherwise (pcs).  
From the sample of 3,275 firms in CIS-2, 42.7% of firms introduced both a product 
and a process innovation; 14.8% of firms introduced only a product innovation and 5.8% of 
firms introduced only a process innovation. Non-innovators constituted 36.6% of the total. 
Because of the considerable share of firms that introduced both product and process 
innovations, we created another set of dummy variables to separate the specific roles of the 
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two types of innovation. The first identifies ‘only product innovator’, and is set at 1 if a firm 
introduced only a product innovation in 1994-1996 and 0 otherwise (onlypdt). The second 
dummy for ‘only process innovator’, is equal to 1 if the firm introduced only a process 
innovation (onlypcs), and the third for ‘product and process innovator’ if the firm introduced 
both a product and a process innovation (pdtpcs).  
 
Control variables 
Firm age is an important control variable, which has been found to shape the survival 
probability (Evans, 1987; Dunne, Roberts & Samuelson, 1988) and the likelihood of being 
acquired (Powell, 1997). Firm age is calculated as date of entry in the ABR. Based on 
evidence that the link between age, survival, and exit may follow an inverted-U shape (Evans, 
1987; Bruderl & Schussler, 1990), we entered the squared term of age into all our models. 
The variable is expressed in logarithm values (lnage) and its squared value calculated 
(sq_age). 
Firm size is one of the conditions that we want to control for. In particular we use the 
current size of a firm (Evans, 1987; Hall, 1987) at the beginning of the period of observation. 
The variable of firm size is derived from the ABR and is measured by the number of 
employees in 1996. In addition, to account for a non-linear relationship between survival, exit, 
and firm size we included the squared term of firm size in all models (Evans, 1987; Hall, 
1987). And, firm size being a highly skewed variable, is transformed in logarithms (lnsize) 
and the squared term calculated (sq_size). 
Finally, as firm age and size may interact in shaping firm survival, we included an 
interaction term between the two variables (Evans, 1987), defined as the product of the 
logarithm of size and the logarithm of age (agesize). 
In order to control for differences in the nature of technology, and their influence on 
the survival or the exit of firms (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001) we classified our firms 
according to Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy. We constructed four dummies for each of Pavitt’s 
firm categories: science-based firms (dpav1), scale intensive firms (dpav2), specialised 
suppliers (dpav3), and supplier dominated firms (dpav4). The last category is the reference 
group in our estimates.  
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5. Results 
In this section we present the results of the competing risks model using the multinomial logit 
form, which is equivalent to assuming a logistic-type hazard function for each exit event, as in 
equation (7). In addition, we use three different versions of the model, each corresponding to 
an alternative set of dummies used to express innovation in a firm, while the control variables 
remain the same for all three models. The estimated coefficients for these models are reported 
in Table 2. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Innovation and type of innovation  
In model 1 we chose as a proxy for the innovative ability of the firm the general dummy for 
the firm’s being an innovator (innov). In this case, innovation has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the probabilities of exit due to failure and to restructuring, while the 
effect is statistically significant but positive for the probability of being acquired.4 In model 2, 
we replace the general innovator variable with product (pdt) and process (pcs) innovator 
dummies, to distinguish between the roles of different types of innovation. We observe that 
the results are differentiated across the different modes of exit, according to the type of 
innovation. Introduction of either product or process innovations significantly decreases the 
probabilities of exit due to failure. This is the only mode of exit where the type of innovation 
introduced does not matter; it is the fact of having innovated that is important. However, the 
probability of exiting as the result of an M&A is significantly and positively affected by the 
firms being involved in product innovations. It seems that firms that can demonstrate ability 
to introduce new products in the market have higher chances of being the targets of M&A 
processes. In the case of exits due to restructuring, on the other hand, firms that have 
introduced process innovations are more likely to survive, or their chances of exiting the 
market are reduced. 
Finally, in order to disentangle the individual roles of product and process innovation, 
from their combined effect, model 3 introduces three dummies that identify firms with 
product innovations only (onlypdt), with process innovations only (onlypcs), and those with 
                                               
4
 From hereon we use the term acquired as being synonymous with “merged and acquired”. It is an abbreviation 
that we use for convenience, but it also reflects the fact that the majority of “mergers and acquisitions” are 
actually acquisitions and are rarely real mergers, in which two previously independent firms lose their identities 
to become (with equal shares, 50%) a completely new firm. 
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both product and process innovations (pdtpcs). The coefficients of these dummies confirm 
and reinforce the previous results. Being an innovator, regardless of which type of innovation 
is involved, is what really matters in reducing the probability of exiting the market because of 
firm failure. Having produced innovative products (and especially where this is not supported 
by process innovation) is relevant in increasing the chances of being acquired, and therefore 
exiting the market. The introduction of both process and product innovation lowers the 
chances of exit due to restructuring.  
These results suggest that innovative firms are less subject to exit by failure and by 
restructuring, independent of the type of innovation they introduce. However, those firms that 
have shown a capacity to create new products, but have not developed new processes in 
combination with them, attract the attention of other (probably larger) firms and became the 
object of M&A. Thus, innovation seems to play two distinct roles according to its 
characteristics: one enhancing exit from the market and the other enhancing survival. 
 
Control variables 
It is worth noting that the statistical significance and the sign of the coefficients of the control 
variables do not change if we use different proxies for innovation to measure the effects of the 
innovative abilities of firms on the probability of different modes of exiting the market. In 
other words, the coefficients are relatively invariant across model 1, 2, and 3. However, 
different effects of these same covariates can be observed across the various modes of exits.  
Firm age (lnage) and firm size (lnsize) both have a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the probability of exit due to failure and to M&A. In contrast, firm size has a 
positive and statistically significant influence on the probability that a firm exits because of 
restructuring. The square of age (sq_age) is significant and positive only for exit as a result of 
failure, while the coefficient of the square of firm size (sq_size) is statistically significant for 
all three types of exit, but with varying sign: it is positive in the case of exit due to failure and 
M&A, and negative in the case of exit due to restructuring. The larger the firm, lower is the 
probability of exit due to failure or M&A and the higher is the probability of exit due to 
radical restructuring; but the magnitude of these effects decreases with firm size. The 
interaction between age and size (agesize) is significant only for exit due to failure. The sign 
is positive, indicating that although firm size and age reduce the probability of exit due to 
failure, this probability declines less rapidly for firms that are, respectively, older and larger. 
Firms may become too large or too old to survive.  
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In order to control for sectoral specificities, we estimated the models using Pavitt’s 
taxonomy and SIC at the 2-digit level. In controlling for sectoral specificities, the coefficients 
of the dummies for Pavitt sectors are significant only in the case of exit due to M&A. 
Belonging to the science-based (dpav1) and specialised supplier (dpav3) sectors decreases the 
probabilities of exit from the market due to being acquired by other firms. These two 
categories of firms include knowledge based firms, which are major ‘producers’ of 
innovations, both product and process. The percentage of innovators in the specialised 
suppliers category is 76.5, in the science-based firms it is 75.7, in the scale intensive firms it is 
60.4, and in the supplier-dominated firms it is 54.4%. Although the percentage of innovators 
can be considered as a measure of the level of technological opportunity this dimension 
represents only one of the technological conditions captured by Pavitt’s taxonomy.5  
When we apply the dummies for the 2-digit sector in which the firm is active rather 
than the Pavitt dummies, the results generally do not change.6 The innovation proxies do not 
lose their significance and their effects on the probabilities of different types of exit change 
neither in direction nor magnitude. This is also the case for the coefficients of the control 
variables for age and size, and their interaction. The effects of belonging to a specific sector 
are mixed; there are no regularities or empirical patterns that emerge from the analysis in 
contrast to what happens when we consider Pavitt’s taxonomy. That is, the dummies for 2-
digit sectors do not identify any particular sectors in which the probabilities of exiting the 
market for a particular reason significantly decrease or increase. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the coefficients of the competing risks model under the 
assumption of a complementary log-log specification for the hazard function, according to 
equation (8). The purpose is to assess the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to different 
hypotheses about the hazards in continuous time, that generate the failure times that were 
registered at discrete intervals. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
The table shows that the estimated coefficients of the complementary log-log model maintain 
                                               
5
 Indeed, Pavitt’s taxonomy simultaneously captures the toughness of competition, market opportunities and 
market growth potential. 
6
 Available on request. 
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statistical significance for the same set of variables as in the case of the logistic specification 
of the hazard functions. It should be noted that the estimated values of the coefficients are 
remarkably similar for the two cases presented in Tables 2 and 3. This suggests that monthly 
intervals in the observation of firms’ exits are quite fine-grained, and different assumptions 
about the behaviour of the continuous hazards within intervals do not lead to substantial 
differences in results. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our empirical analyses show that the ability of a firm to introduce an innovation affects the 
likelihood of the firm exiting the market, but that this effect varies according to the nature of 
innovation and type of firm exit. We used data on a sample of 3,275 manufacturing firms in 
the Netherlands, with 10 or more employees. For these firms, we matched data on overall 
innovative performance in the period 1994-1996 (obtained from CIS-2), with monthly data on 
exit events in the period 1996-2003 (derived from the ABR of the entire population of firms in 
the Netherlands). We found that innovation reduces the probability of a firm dying or 
undergoing a process of radical restructuring. However, it also exposes the firm to a higher 
risk of exiting due to M&A. When the effects of different types of innovation, namely product 
and process, are separated the effects remain invariant for the risk of exit by failure, and to a 
certain extent, for the risk of exit due to radical restructuring. In contrast, the nature of the 
innovation plays a role in the probability of a firm exiting due to M&A. It is product 
innovation, without complementary development of new or improved production processes, 
which increases the risk of the firm being acquired (or involved in a merger). With regard to 
the effects of firm age and size, our findings confirm previous evidence that larger and older 
firms are subject to lower risks of failure and being acquired, although at a decreasing rate in 
most cases. In contrast, the risk of radical restructuring increases with firm size.  
In sum, the risk of firm exit from the market is influenced by its own innovative 
capabilities and structural characteristics such as age and size. Innovation represents a 
resource and a capability that helps the firm to acquire competitive advantage and to stay in 
the market, in particular avoiding the risk of failure and radical restructuring. Yet, when these 
capabilities lead to the development of new products, but not new processes, firms become 
more attractive for acquisition by other firms. These capabilities are more likely to be 
“purchased” by and integrated into other organisations. In this case, the exit of the firm does 
not indicate failure, but rather a form of transfer of new knowledge from one organisation to 
another.    
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Table 1. Composition of sample and population
Observations %
Average 
Employment
ABR
Exits
Failure 24,222 39.6 5.6
M&A 3,077 5.0 33.9
Restructuring 263 0.4 227.1
Continuing firms 33,614 55.0 19.2
Observations 61,176
ABR (10 or more employees)
Exits
Failure 2,247 18.3 42.6
M&A 1,197 9.8 81
Restructuring 225 1.8 264.8
Continuing firms 8,591 70.1 74.4
Observations 12,260
CIS-2
Exits
Failure 391 11.9 66.5
M&A 275 8.4 114.1
Restructuring 72 2.2 193
Continuing firms 2,537 77.5 120.9
Observations 3,275
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Table 2. Competing risks model - Estimates of multinomial logistic regression         
Exit mode Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Failure
innov -.479 (.000)
pdt -.288 (.031)
pcs -.253 (.059)
onlypdt -.369 (.023)
onlypcs -.424 (.073)
pdtpcs -.531 (.000)
lnage -.976 (.003) -.957 (.003) -.971 (.003)
lnsize -1.238 (.000) -1.257 (.000) -1.252 (.000)
agesize .089 (.030) .088 (.031) .089 (.030)
sq_age 0.040 (.168) .039 (.186) .040 (.173)
sq_size .064 (.006) .068 (.004) .067 (.004)
dpav1 .211 (.125) .211 (.129) .210 (.132)
dpav2 -.040 (.748) -.039 (.757) -.041 (.744)
dpav3 -.086 (.644) -.115 (.544) -.107 (.572)
M&A
innov .243 (.069)
pdt .393 (.014)
pcs -.202 (.188)
onlypdt .482 (.009)
onlypcs .010 (.971)
pdtpcs .199 (.171)
lnage -.928 (.014) -.959 (.011) -.950 (.012)
lnsize -.604 (.095) -.618 (.091) -.628 (.084)
agesize .018 (.685) .019 (.671) .019 (.678)
sq_age .073 (.012) .076 (.009) .075 (.009)
sq_size .048 (.103) .049 (.093) .051 (.083)
dpav1 -.298 (.104) -.341 (.065) -.342 (.065)
dpav2 .213 (.125) .194 (.164) .195 (.160)
dpav3 -.730 (.006) -.812 (.003) -.823 (.002)
Restructuring
innov -.777 (.002)
pdt -.154 (.613)
pcs -.506 (.091)
onlypdt -.710 (.082)
onlypcs -42.773 (1.000)+
pdtpcs -.652 (.014)
lnage -.264 (.734) -.276 (.720) -.318 (.683)
lnsize 1.763 (.056) 1.650 (.073) 1.792 (.052)
agesize .023 (.809) .023 (.805) .023 (.803)
sq_age -.028 (.621) -.026 (.637) -.023 (.687)
sq_size -.139 (.052) -.128 (.073) -.144 (.047)
dpav1 -.391 (.266) -.459 (.196) -.469 (.185)
dpav2 -.233 (.411) -.251 (.376) -.265 (.351)
dpav3 -.109 (.778) -.248 (.533) -.200 (.613)
Log-likelihood -5551.17 -5551.43 -5545.21
LR Chi Square 340.19 339.66 352.10
p-value (.000) (.000) (.000)
Observations 249287 249287 249287
 
+
 The result is due to the lack of variability and the small number of observations in this particular category: firms that have developed 
only process innovations and experience a radical restructuring (see also Table 3).
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Notes: Significant coefficients (p<0.10) in bold. The dependent variable is the ratio between the probability of an exit event and the 
probability of the continuing state (or survival), the latter selected as base outcome.
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Table 3. Competing risks model - Estimates of complementary log-log regression         
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Variables (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
innov -.478 .244 -.776
(.000) (.068) (.002)
pdt -.288 .394 -.154
(.031) (.014) (.612)
pcs -.252 -.201 -.505
(.059) (.189) (.092)
onlypdt -.369 .482 -.710
(.023) (.009) (.082)
onlypcs -.423 .011 *
(.074) (.967)
pdtpcs -.531 .200 -.651
(.000) (.168) (.014)
lnage -.971 -.952 -.967 -.923 -.954 -.945 -.258 -.271 -.313
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.014) (.012) (.012) (.739) (.725) (.688)
lnsize -1.235 -1.255 -1.249 -.599 -.613 -.623 1.768 1.654 1.796
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.097) (.093) (.086) (.055) (.072) (.051)
agesize .088 .088 .088 .018 .019 .018 .023 .023 .023
(.030) (.031) (.030) (.690) (.676) (.683) (.811) (.808) (.806)
sq_age .040 .038 .040 .073 .075 .075 -.028 -.027 -.023
(.170) (.188) (.175) (.012) (.009) (.010) (.617) (.633) (.682)
sq_size .064 .068 .066 .047 .049 .051 -.140 -.129 -.144
(.006) (.004) (.004) (.104) (.095) (.084) (.052) (.072) (.046)
dpav1 .211 .212 .210 -.298 -.341 -.342 -.391 -.459 -.468
(.124) (.128) (.131) (.104) (.065) (.065) (.266) (.196) (.185)
dpav2 -.040 -.039 -.041 .213 .194 .195 -.233 -.252 -.265
(.747) (.756) (.743) (.124) (.163) (.160) (.410) (.376) (.350)
dpav3 -.085 -.114 -.106 -.730 -.811 -.822 -.108 -.247 -.198
(.646) (.547) (.575) (.006) (.003) (.002) (.780) (.535) (.615)
Log-likelihood -2831.4 -2831.3 -2830.9 -2104.8 -2103.5 -2103.1 -615.8 -617.4 -612.0
LR Chi Square 168.6 168.7 169.5 85.3 88.0 88.8 86.0 82.7 84.9
p-value (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
* Observations were dropped because the value of onlypcs equal to 1 predicts failure perfectly.
Notes: Significant coefficients (p<0.10) in bold. The dependent variable is the ratio between the probability of an exit event and the probability of the continuing state (or survival), the 
latter selected as base outcome. Number of observations = 249287.
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